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The Process of Wage Adjustment:  
An Analysis Using Establishment-Level Data 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article, we use data from Spanish manufacturing plants to analyze the 
determinants of the importance attributed to several criteria when wages are adjusted. 
More specifically, the criteria we take into account in the study are the cost of living, 
the wages of the firm in relation to its competitors, the fulfillment of collective 
agreements at sector level, the need to recruit and retain employees, the performance of 
the organization, and the industrial relations climate. Our results show that the structural 
characteristics of the establishment, as well as the wage setting arrangements and trade 
unions, play a role in explaining the importance of the factors mentioned in shaping 
wage adjustments. The human resource management policies adopted by the employer 
seem to be less relevant. 
 
Keywords: human resource management, structural characteristics, trade unions, wage 
adjustment, wage setting arrangements   
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Introduction 
The analysis of wage determination is a topic that has received significant 
attention from researchers. Hence, the study of the determinants of wage levels and 
wage differentials has been approached from both theoretical and empirical points of 
view (see Werner and Ward, 2004). However, wage determination continues to attract 
the interest of academics as there are still unanswered questions regarding this issue. 
One topic of interest in the literature on wage determination is the analysis of 
pay settlements. According to the terminology of collective bargaining, a pay settlement 
is an adjustment in the wages paid to a group of workers that is carried out with a 
certain periodicity (see Forth and Millward, 2000). It has been recognized that pay 
settlements revolve around certain variables, which are grouped into two categories: 
factors internal to the establishment and factors external to it. Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1988) introduced this baseline classification and identified several factors taken into 
account by employers when they adjust the wages of their employees. Subsequent 
studies have drawn on this work and analyzed the relevance of internal and external 
variables in the size of pay settlements (see Ingram et al., 1999; Forth and Millward, 
2000; or Brown et al. 2004; among others)
1
. These studies provide support for the fact 
that wage adjustments at plant level revolve around factors such as the cost of living or 
the performance of the organization. But what shapes the weight given to these factors 
by employers when determining pay settlements? 
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Labor regulation concerns have been highlighted as major influences on the 
factors that influence pay settlements. In particular, a strong regulatory framework is 
associated with a high incidence of external factors, whereas low regulation is linked to 
a greater freedom for the employer to link wages to the internal circumstances of the 
organization. Ingram et al. (1999) analyze these issues in the British context and show 
that, despite the process of deregulation carried out by British governments in recent 
decades, external pressures continue to be very relevant in pay setting processes. Their 
results suggest that, besides labor market regulation, other circumstances could 
influence the weight given to internal and external factors in pay settlements. In this 
article, we want to shed light on this issue and analyze the circumstances that shape the 
importance given by employers to different factors when wages are adjusted. To do so, 
we use establishment data and examine the process of wage adjustment at workplace 
level. The relevance of the establishment component in the determination of wages has 
been widely acknowledged (see Groshen, 1991a and 1991b; Bronars and Famulari, 
1997; Stephan, 2002; Lane et al., 2007; Gruetter and Lalive, 2009). Given the 
importance of the establishment features in pay determination, we want to test the 
significance of this component when it comes to pay settlements.  
In order to carry out the analysis, we draw on the theories of pay determination 
and the empirical literature on employer wage differentials. This framework provides 
insights into employer attitudes toward pay decisions (see Forth and Millward, 2000). 
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On the basis of the aforementioned theories, we identify six factors that influence 
management decisions on pay adjustments: the cost of living, the wages of the firm in 
relation to its competitors, the fulfillment of sector-level collective agreements, the need 
to recruit and retain workers, the performance of the firm, and the need to maintain a 
good industrial relations climate. Then, we examine the variables that determine the 
importance given to these factors by employers when adjusting wages. More precisely, 
we include three groups of explanatory variables in the analysis: structural factors and 
market conditions, human resource management (from now on, HRM) policies, and 
wage-setting arrangements and the influence of trade unions. The study is based on a 
data set on HRM practices and industrial relations, which comes from a survey 
conducted in 2006 on a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we examine the 
factors that may shape wage adjustments. Then, we make hypotheses regarding the 
influence of a set of explanatory variables on the importance given to these factors. 
Section four describes the data set and the methodology used in the analysis. In section 
five, we present the results of the empirical analysis. Some conclusions are outlined in 
the final section.  
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The Pressures on Wage Adjustments  
From a theoretical point of view, wage determination is a complex process in 
which many factors play a role. In practice, wages in the workplace are frequently 
determined through pay settlements (see Forth and Millward, 2000). An analysis of pay 
settlements can help us to understand better wage determination processes within the 
workplace, since employers commonly adjust the wages of a whole group of employees 
simultaneously and with a fixed periodicity (see Brown et al., 2004). As we have 
already mentioned, pay settlements revolve around several factors that reflect both the 
internal characteristics of the organization and external circumstances (see 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988). In what follows, we offer an account of the factors 
considered in our study as potential influences upon wage adjustments. In order to 
select these factors, we draw on previous studies of pay settlement influences and 
theories of pay determination (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Ingram et al., 1999; 
Forth and Millward, 2000; and Brown et al., 2004; among others). 
Regarding the factors external to the establishment, the first influence included 
in the analysis is the cost of living. The cost of living is a variable that both employers 
and employees take as a reference when negotiating and determining wage adjustments. 
Although the precise role of the inflation rate on pay settlements is still not completely 
understood, it is widely accepted that most settlements reflect this value to some extent 
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(see Ingram et al., 1999; and Brown et al. 2004). An aspect worth considering in 
relation to the importance of this criterion is the possibility that labor contracts include 
wage indexation clauses (see Jimenez-Martin, 1998). The existence of these clauses 
may reduce the uncertainty associated with the real value of wages, rendering the 
inflation rate more significant when pay is being set. This is well reflected in the 
Spanish economy, where a considerable percentage of labor contracts usually contain 
such clauses. According to the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO), in 
2005 wage revision clauses were included in 36.7 per cent of Spanish collective 
agreements and covered 69 per cent of workers (see EIRO, 2006). 
The wages of the firm in relation to its competitors is also a significant factor 
when employers adjust their wages. On the one hand, comparability may be used by the 
employer as a standard for how wages should be settled in line with what other 
organizations are doing. On the other hand, employees can take the wages paid 
elsewhere in the market as a base from which to make demands regarding their own 
remuneration. From a transaction costs perspective (see Williamson, 2010), a 
comparison with the wages paid in other firms might reduce the costs associated with 
pay setting and facilitate pay decisions for both employers and employees (see Forth 
and Millward, 2000). Hence, this criterion may be expected to be particularly relevant 
for employers who want to minimize the costs of wage adjustment processes. 
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In some organizations, working conditions and, particularly, pay policies are the 
result of bargaining processes between employers and workers’ representatives, 
resulting in the application of sector-level agreements that regulate the employment 
relationship. Collective bargaining at the industry level establishes the framework 
within which wages are determined, and it imposes restrictions on the employers’ pay 
decisions. Hence, the fulfillment of sector collective agreements as an additional 
pertinent external factor in wage adjustments is also included. 
As we have already mentioned, pay settlements are also dependent on the 
internal conditions of the plant. One such condition is the establishment's need to recruit 
and retain workers. The level of wages offered by the company and the wage 
adjustments made to existent employment contracts affect the possibility of hiring and 
retaining workers. According to the efficiency wages theory, wages that are above the 
market-clearing level can induce a positive effect as regards the effort made by workers. 
The implementation of a high-level wage system has additional implications for 
employers, such as the possibility of recruiting more qualified workers or a reduction in 
the turnover rate in the establishment (see Bryson and Forth, 2008). Therefore, in 
situations where the organization is expanding and it needs skilled workers, or when 
turnover costs are high, wages can be used as a tool to attract and retain employees. In 
addition, the influence of the need to recruit and retain workers on wages can be 
understood in terms of the principal-agent theory. This theory assumes that employee 
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and employer pursue different objectives, with the former incurring a cost in providing 
higher effort. As a response, the employer should design the compensation policy that 
deals with the contractual hazards faced by the organization and helps to implement the 
desired hiring and retaining policies (see Prendergast, 1999).  
It should be noted that, although the need to recruit and retain workers depends 
on the internal conditions of the plant, this variable is also influenced by the situation of 
the labor market. More precisely, the importance of the need to recruit and retain 
workers for an establishment depends upon the supply and demand for labor in the 
market. As a consequence, the hiring and retaining factor reflects both the internal 
contingencies of the plant and the external environment in which it operates.  
An organization’s ability to pay is a constraint on the determination of wage 
outcomes by the employer. The rent-sharing model states that pay determination is the 
result of a distribution of workplace rents between organizational agents (see 
Blanchflower et al., 1990). According to this model, if an organization generates rents 
and its workers possess some bargaining power, they can negotiate rent sharing with 
their employers (see Groshen, 1991a). As a consequence, we take into account the 
influence of organizational performance on pay settlements as an indicator of the 
employer’s ability to pay. The significance of organizational performance in pay 
settlements might also be supported from an occupational commitment perspective (see 
Meyer and Herscovitch, 2001). This perspective emphasizes the idea that an increase in 
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occupational commitment improves organizational performance. Applying this idea to 
the purpose of this study, linking wage increases to the performance of the organization 
could enhance workers’ commitment to the job, thus affecting their attitudes and, by 
extension, improving organizational outcomes.  
Finally, the industrial relations climate also has a bearing on wage determination 
processes. The industrial relations climate refers to the quality of the relationship 
between employees and employers in the workplace (see Deery et al., 1999). The 
existence of conflict in relationships in the establishment may impose restrictions on 
pay setting by employers due to the different interests pursued by each party during the 
bargaining process. Moreover, it is possible that a deteriorating industrial relations 
climate increases the threat of industrial action, and the employer may use wage 
increases in order to improve the working environment (see Jimenez-Martin, 2006) 
 
Establishment Features and the Factors that Influence Pay Settlements 
We have already described the factors taken into account by employers when they 
adjust wages. In what follows, we make hypotheses concerning the influence of a set of 
variables on the importance given to those factors. We group the variables into the 
following categories: structural characteristics and market conditions, HRM policies 
and human capital variables, and wage setting arrangements and the influence of trade 
unions.  
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Structural Characteristics and Market Conditions  
The first category of variables included in our study represents basic features of 
the workplace and the market in which the company performs its activity. In particular, 
we take into account the size of the establishment, the issue of foreign ownership and 
the degree of competition. 
The relationship between firm size and wages has been widely studied in the 
past. As a consequence, there is abundant empirical literature on this topic, revealing the 
existence of a positive effect of firm size on wages (see Belfield and Wei, 2004; or 
Lallemand et al., 2005, among others). Regarding pay settlements, we expect to find a 
significant incidence of size on the factors taken into account by employers when wages 
are adjusted. First, occupational groups become larger as the size of the establishment 
increases. Large occupational groups may contain workers with different characteristics, 
and it could be difficult to determine a general wage adjustment that precisely reflects 
such varied characteristics (see Forth and Millward, 2000). Therefore, large 
organizations probably incur higher costs when setting pay. From a transaction costs 
perspective (see Williamson, 2010), they might choose to externalize or “buy” the 
transaction of pay determination in the market. In order to do so, employers could use 
an external variable of reference such as the cost of living or the wages paid by other 
firms.  
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Hypothesis 1: When adjusting their wages, large establishments give more 
importance to the cost of living and the wages of the firm relative to its competitors.  
Large organizations are thought to match workers to jobs more efficiently (see 
Belfield and Wei, 2004). Efficient job matching in large firms could be due to various 
reasons, such as the possibility of job reallocation, sorting during the selection process 
or the provision of higher stability within the firm. In relation to this idea, it has been 
shown that internal job movement is higher in large firms (see Brown and Medoff, 
1989). Therefore, workers can more easily move between assignments and avoid 
quitting, which facilitates job matching. Consequently, the matching process suggests 
that, as the size of the establishment increases, employers will be less concerned about 
the need to recruit and retain employees. 
  Hypothesis 2: When adjusting their wages, large establishments give less 
importance to the need to recruit and retain workers.  
Size and wages could also be linked by the idea of compensating wage 
differentials (see Brown and Medoff, 1989). The literature on the size-wage effect has 
pointed out that large organizations provide workers with poorer working conditions, 
such as an impersonal atmosphere or higher levels of bureaucracy (see Green et al., 
1996). Consequently, these firms should display lower levels of job satisfaction that 
worsen the climate of industrial relations. If these conditions characterize large 
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establishments, they should give more importance to the industrial relations climate 
when wages are settled.  
Hypothesis 3: When adjusting their wages, large establishments are more 
concerned about the industrial relations climate.  
In some countries, the probability that a firm-specific agreement is signed 
increases with the size of the establishment. This is the case of Spain, among other 
countries, as Plasman et al. (2007) point out. According to these authors, workers tend 
to be better organized in large firms, which favors the establishment of a specific 
collective agreement. In other words, large firms in Spain have a higher probability of 
being managed under a firm agreement than under a sector-level agreement. 
Consequently, we anticipate that establishments with a high number of employees will 
give less importance than small establishments to sector-level agreements when setting 
pay. 
Hypothesis 4: When adjusting their wages, large establishments are less 
concerned about the fulfillment of sector agreements.  
The next factor of interest for pay settlements is foreign ownership. 
Multinational companies operate in different countries, where they may encounter 
different institutional settings. Due to the challenge of operating in an international 
environment, multinationals develop more complex HRM systems (see Bayo-Moriones 
and Galdon-Sanchez, 2010). As a result, we expect to find differences between 
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establishments that belong to a multinational group and domestic plants in relation to 
the formulation of compensation strategies. 
Compensation policies contribute to solving agency problems through the 
provision of incentives to workers (see Prendergast, 1999). A possible incentive system 
firms can use consists in linking wages to organizational performance, which helps to 
align worker objectives with those of the company and enhances their effort. Regarding 
the particular case of multinational companies, they operate in dispersed locations, so 
there may be a considerable distance and a variety of goals among the different 
subsidiaries and the headquarters (see Gong, 2003). Because of this distance and goal-
divergence, workers probably find it difficult to discern a clear impact of their effort on 
the performance of the organization that may motivate them to act in the firm’s best 
interest. Consequently, linking wages to organizational performance may not be the 
optimal compensation strategy in such companies. From this idea, we may conclude 
that the provision of incentives through wages linked to organizational performance is 
less likely to be less prevalent in foreign-owned establishments.  
Hypothesis 5: When adjusting their wages, multinationals give less importance 
to the performance of the organization in comparison with domestically-owned plants. 
Another factor of interest in the determination of wages is the degree of 
competition. It has been argued that product market conditions that affect the demand 
for labor might have an effect on employers’ decisions regarding wage adjustments (see 
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Forth and Millward, 2000). The degree of competition is one of these conditions, since 
it influences the demand for labor in the market. When employers face a high number of 
rival firms, they have to compete for the labor force, so they will be more conscious 
about hiring and firing issues. Consequently, we expect to find a correlation between the 
degree of competition in the product market and the importance given to recruitment 
and retention issues in pay settlements. In relation to this idea, Amable and Gatti (2004) 
described a model that emphasizes the link between competition, turnover and wages.  
Hypothesis 6: When adjusting their wages, plants that face a high degree of 
competition will give more importance to the need to recruit and retain workers. 
 
Human Resource Management Policies 
The HRM strategies adopted by an employer are also expected to correlate with 
wage outcomes. In what follows, we account for several variables that reflect the HRM 
policies and human capital features of the establishment, and we describe their expected 
influence on the importance given to our factors of interest. 
First, the neo-classical model of the labor market predicts higher wages for 
workers with greater education and training levels, since education and training are 
associated with increased productivity among employees (see Bryson and Forth, 2008). 
Workers with high productivity levels have a significant influence on the results of the 
organization, and a loss of this type of worker may be particularly harmful for the 
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employer (see Dearden et al., 2006). In other words, when workers have received high 
education or training levels, they turn into valuable assets for the firm. Consequently, it 
is in the employer’s interest to retain them in the organization. In the case of the 
provision of training by the employer, there is also a training cost involved, which 
increases the interest in the need to retain them. 
Hypothesis 7: When adjusting their wages, plants with high education and 
training levels will give more importance to the need to recruit and retain employees. 
The literature on the provision of incentives by organizations points out that 
incentives are not only used to enhance worker effort, but also to influence worker self-
selection in relation to the firm (see Lazear, 2000). In particular, when wages are linked 
to performance, there is a sorting effect and more productive workers are attracted into 
the organization. Dohmen and Falk (2011) use education as a proxy for productivity to 
provide evidence on this sorting effect. From this idea, we expect that wages are more 
dependent on performance in establishments with well-educated workers, 
Hypothesis 8: When adjusting their wages, plants with highly educated workers 
will give more importance to the performance of the organization. 
Many firms have internal labor markets, where employees’ careers develop 
within a single organization (see Osterman, 2010). Hiring for the lower levels of the 
hierarchy is done at a small number of entry points, and jobs at higher levels are filled 
through internal promotion. Enduring employment relations, established career paths 
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and on-the-job training are among the most frequently cited features of these companies 
(see Baker et al., 1994). The existence of internal promotion as well as employment 
stability can be an incentive for applicants to enter the firm, as well as for workers to 
stay in the organization (see Lazear and Oyer, 2004). Thus, it is possible that 
organizations with internal labor markets need not use pay as a mechanism for hiring 
and retaining employees.  
Hypothesis 9: When adjusting their wages, plants with internal labor markets 
give less importance to the need to recruit and retain employees.  
The pay policy adopted by the employer is also a potential determinant of the 
importance given to the factors of interest in wage adjustments. One significant aspect 
of pay policy is the relationship between the wage level of the establishment and the 
remuneration of comparable workers. The efficiency wages approach points out that 
offering higher wages than those paid in other organizations is a mechanism to attract 
new employees and retain the ones who already work in the establishment (see Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1986). Hence, we expect that those employers who pay high wages will be 
less concerned with the need to recruit and retain workers in pay settlements.  
Hypothesis 10: When adjusting their wages, employers who pay high wages will 
be less concerned with the need to recruit and retain workers.  
Another relevant aspect of the wage policy of an establishment is the use of pay 
systems based on the performance of workers. As we have already mentioned, these 
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systems might increase worker motivation by making them benefactors of the gains 
obtained at individual, group or company level (see Prendergast, 1999). The use of this 
type of incentives reflects the employer’s interest in sharing gains with employees as a 
means to increase their motivation and, consequently, their productivity. In other words, 
linking pay with performance may be part of the compensation and motivation policy 
adopted by the organization. Hence, it is possible that the adoption of a system of pay 
for performance correlates positively with the importance given to the performance of 
the organization in pay settlements.  
Hypothesis 11: When adjusting their wages, plants that use pay for performance 
systems gill give more importance to the performance of the organization. 
 
Wage-Setting Arrangements and Trade Unions  
We expect that wage bargaining arrangements play a significant role in pay 
setting processes at establishment level. In Spain, collective bargaining is the legally 
recognized mechanism to set wages and, more generally, working conditions. 
Regarding the structure of collective bargaining, two main levels of negotiation are 
identified: the sector level, which includes both national and regional agreements, and 
the firm level (see Canal-Domiguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez, 2004). Previous evidence 
has shown that the degree of centralization of collective bargaining affects wage levels 
(see Card and de la Rica, 2006; or Plasman et al., 2007; among others). Specifically, 
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these studies have found that organizations subject to firm collective agreements pay a 
wage premium in comparison with those companies subject to multi-employer 
agreements. Rent-sharing concerns, the use of efficiency wages by the employer or 
unmeasured ability differences have been pointed to as possible explanations of the 
firm-agreement wage premium. Our aim is to examine how the degree of centralization 
applies to the issue of wage adjustments.   
In Spain, collective agreements can be extended by law to non-unionized firms 
or workers belonging to the area of negotiation (see Canal Dominguez and Rodriguez 
Gutierrez, 2004). As a result, bargaining coverage is high, affecting around 60 per cent 
of Spanish workers. Regional sector agreements are predominant, covering more than 
50 per cent of the workers subject to collective bargaining. National sector agreements 
affect around 25 per cent of workers, whereas firm-level agreements only cover 10 per 
cent of workers (see EIRO, 2009). Regarding the manufacturing sector, in 2006 around 
13 per cent of workers covered by collective agreements were subject to firm-level 
contracts, and bargaining at a higher level affected the remaining 87 per cent of 
workers, in line with the pattern of centralization that characterizes the Spanish 
bargaining system (see Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, 2006).  
Work councils negotiate employment terms at firm level, whereas the main 
union confederations bargain at higher levels. These unions also take part in firm-level 
negotiations, as an important proportion of work councils members belong to them.  
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Management negotiates at firm level, whereas employer organizations participate in 
negotiations at higher levels. According to the Survey on Quality of Life in the 
Workplace (2010), 20.4 per cent of manufacturing workers were members of a trade 
union. Information on employer representation is scarce for Spain. However, it is 
believed that between 70 to 80 per cent of Spanish employers belong to the CEOE 
(Confederacion Española de Organizaciones Empresariales), the Spanish Confederation 
of Employers’ Organizations, or to other organizations directly dependent on the CEOE 
(see European Commission, 2008).  
Another aspect of the Spanish industrial relations climate worth mentioning is 
the quality of the relationship between employees and managers. Although industrial 
conflict has decreased over the last few decades, international reports still present Spain 
as a country with one of the worst records in Europe as far as industrial conflict is 
concerned (see Scheuer, 2006). This is shown, for example, in the figures regarding one 
form of industrial action in Spain: strikes. According to the International Labour 
Organization, 116.9 days were lost in Spain per 1,000 workers in manufacturing in 2006 
(see International Labour Organization, 2006). This figure is significantly higher than 
the data for other European Union countries such as the United Kingdom (6 days lost 
per 100 workers), Germany (10.8 days), Portugal (26 days) or Italy (85.8 days).  
We now examine the influence of wage-setting arrangements and trade unions 
on pay settlements. Regarding the importance given to the cost of living, we think that 
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this is a variable of concern to employees when negotiating wage increases. The 
inflation rate determines the purchasing power of wages, so employees want to obtain 
wage rises that at least cover the variation in the level of prices (see Forth and Millward, 
2000). If wages are set through collective bargaining, either at sector or firm level, 
workers can express this demand through their representatives, and fight for salaries that 
maintain their purchasing power. 
Hypothesis 12:  When adjusting their wages, establishments where any type of 
collective agreement exists will give more importance to the cost of living. 
Under collective bargaining at the firm level, the employer can adapt wages to 
the particular circumstances of the organization, whereas the presence of a sector 
agreement imposes more restrictions on pay setting processes (see Gerlach and Stephan, 
2006). Moreover, several studies have found the existence of a wage premium 
associated with the presence of a firm-specific contract (see Card and de la Rica, 2006). 
On the other hand, when wage adjustments are set unilaterally by employers or 
negotiated on an individual worker-employer basis, the firm will have a greater ability 
to make wages flexible so that they are closely linked to the performance of the firm. 
Hypothesis 13: When adjusting their wages, establishments where working 
conditions are determined at firm level, via collective agreement or another mechanism 
of wage determination, will give more importance to the performance of the 
organization.  
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We expect to find a positive correlation between the existence of any type of 
collective bargaining and the importance given to the climate of industrial relations 
when wages are adjusted. Two arguments can be used to support this hypothesis. First, 
it is possible that the employer wants to create a good working environment and uses 
bargaining with the employees in order to achieve harmonious industrial relations 
within the workplace. Second, collective bargaining may result in a deterioration of the 
employment relationship because the parties involved in negotiations pursue different 
interests. As a consequence, the employer could be more concerned about the 
importance of the industrial relations climate in pay settlements and use wage increases 
as a mechanism for restoring a good working environment (see Jimenez-Martin, 2006). 
Hypothesis 14: When adjusting their wages, establishments where any type of 
collective agreement exists will give more importance to the industrial relations 
climate. 
Although we expect to observe differences in the pressures on wage increases 
depending on the mechanism of pay setting that operates in the organization, it is also 
possible that the influence of the unions present in the establishment has an effect on the 
factors that determine pay adjustments. In other words, besides being influential in the 
possibility that a firm-collective agreement is reached (as Card and de la Rica (2006) 
point out), trade union power within the establishment can ensure that certain factors are 
regarded as more important than others when wages are adjusted. Union influence could 
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be a proxy for the share of power between the employer and the employees regarding 
wage setting processes. Whereas the presence of a firm contract is the result of the 
initiative of both employer and employees, reflecting the interests of both parties and 
the probability that they may reach an agreement, trade union influence only represents 
workers’ power.  
First, trade unions are concerned about the living standard of workers. If their 
influence in the establishment is high, they will try to obtain wage rises that reflect the 
expected increase in the cost of living (see Jimenez-Martin, 1998). Consequently, we 
expect a positive relationship between union influence and the importance given to 
inflation in pay settlements. 
Hypothesis 15: When adjusting their wages, establishments where trade unions 
have a high degree of influence will give more importance to the cost of living. 
In Spain, trade unions participate in negotiations in different firms, so the 
information on bargaining outcomes can be transferred across union members in 
different negotiation units (see Rigby et al., 2009). When unions have power to 
influence working conditions, it is more likely that they would use the information 
obtained from other firms to demand wages similar to those paid in other organizations.  
Hypothesis 16: When adjusting their wages, establishments where trade unions 
have a high degree of influence will give more importance to the wages of the firm 
relative to its competitors. 
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Trade unions focus primarily on improving the contracts of existing workers, 
that is, those currently working in the organization (see Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000). 
When unions are strong in an establishment, they can exert their power to protect the 
interests of insiders. As a result of this protection, firing workers becomes more difficult 
for the employer, and the turnover rate of the establishment decreases (see Bentolila et 
al., 1994). Consequently, our sense is that the need to recruit and retain workers 
becomes less relevant to pay setting as union power in the organization increases. 
Hypothesis 17: When adjusting their wages, establishments where trade unions 
have a high degree of influence will give less importance to the need to recruit and 
retain workers. 
Finally, linking wages to performance introduces uncertainty in compensation. 
Employees may be regarded as risk averse when it comes to wages. In addition, they try 
to avoid wage loses that are due to mismanagement or the bad economic situation (see 
Kurdelbusch, 2002). When trade unions have influence in the establishment, workers 
can express these concerns regarding wage uncertainty. When wages depend on firm 
performance, differences in worker pay across firms emerge. Such differences violate 
the equality principle defended by trade unions. Consequently, we predict that the 
presence of strong unions in the establishment renders the process of trying to adjust 
wages to the performance of the company more difficult.  
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Hypothesis 18: When adjusting their wages, establishments where trade unions 
have a high degree of influence will give less importance to the performance of the 
organization. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Data and Variables 
Drawing on the preliminary work of Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), our study 
is based on management perceptions of the factors that influence wage adjustments at 
establishment level. According to these authors, questionnaire information such as that 
used in this study can help to test the predictions of the wage determination theories. In 
particular, we use a data set gathered in 2006 through personal interviews with 
managers in Spanish manufacturing plants with fifty or more employees, which 
represents a unique source of information about a range of HRM practices in Spanish 
firms.  
The data was drawn from personal interviews with one of the managers at the 
plant. Questions were addressed initially to the human resources manager. When there 
was no human resources manager in the plant, the general manager was interviewed, 
since this figure also has extensive knowledge of the HRM policies in an establishment. 
In practice the human resource manager was the figure most frequently interviewed. 
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Most of the information on HRM refers exclusively to blue-collar workers, that is, those 
workers involved directly in the production process. The reason for restricting the 
analysis to this category of employees lies in the existence of a variety of internal labor 
markets with different features within the same organization. Limiting the study to 
manual workers makes comparisons across establishments easier. 
The range of potential respondents for the purposes of the survey comprised all 
Spanish manufacturing establishments which had fifty or more employees in 2005. 
After stratification by sector, size and location, a random selection of workplaces was 
obtained from the Spanish Central Directory of Firms (Directorio Central de Empresas, 
DIRCE) of the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
INE), using data from 2005.  
The interviews with managers who agreed to answer our questionnaire were 
performed by specially-trained professionals in computer-assisted telephone interviews 
(CATI). The final sample comprises 1,001 establishments, which matches expectations 
regarding the size of the data set and yields a response rate of 34.1 per cent
2
. Since our 
analysis focuses on pay settlements, we only take into account those plants in which 
there have been generalized wage increases for production workers in any of the three 
years previous to the collection of the data
3
. A total of 278 plants reported that there had 
not been a general wage increase for production workers in any of the previous three 
years. Consequently, the sample size decreases to 723 establishments. In addition, some 
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of the interviewees did not report information on some of the variables of interest for 
our analysis. Since the regressions include only the plants for which we have 
information on all variables, the final sub-sample used in the estimations comprises a 
total of 602 observations.  
We consider the following pressures on wage adjustments as dependent 
variables in the empirical analysis: the cost of living, comparability with other firms’ 
wages, the fulfillment of collective agreements at the sector level, the need to recruit 
and retain employees of the establishment, the performance of the organization, and the 
need to maintain a good industrial relations climate. The variables capture the 
importance given to each factor when wages are increased on a scale ranging from 0 
(unimportant factor) to 10 (very important factor). For the purposes of our analysis, 
these variables are ipsatized in order to obtain homogeneous scores across the different 
establishments and facilitate the interpretation of the regression results. 
Three groups of variables are included in the regressions as explanatory factors. 
The first set refers to the workplace structural factors and the conditions of the product 
market: the size of the plant, belonging to a multinational corporation, and the degree of 
competition. The second category includes variables related to the HRM strategy and 
the characteristics of the human capital in the organization: the provision of training, the 
percentage of workers with a university degree, the presence of internal promotions and 
the percentage of permanent workers (these two variables represent the existence of 
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internal labor markets), the wage level paid by the employer and the use of pay for 
performance systems. The last group comprises the wage-setting arrangement that 
operates in the establishment (i.e. plant or firm collective agreement, sector collective 
agreement or another mechanism of wage determination) and the influence of trade 
unions
4
. The definitions, means and standard deviations of all variables are included in 
Table 1.  
 
Methodology 
The data set contains information on the pressures that affect wage adjustments 
only for plants where there were general wage increases for production workers in one 
of the three years previous to the collection of the information. Therefore, it is possible 
that we face sample selection bias in the analysis. In order to account for this possibility 
we have proceeded as follows. As a first step, we have estimated a probit model of the 
determinants of the existence of wage increases, which is our selection variable, and 
used this estimation to calculate the inverse Mills ratio.  
An issue worth mentioning regarding this sample selection correction is that we 
have included the same set of regressors both in the selection and the outcome 
equations, that is, we have no exclusion restriction. The reason for proceeding in this 
way is twofold. Firstly, we have examined the collinearity between the regressors (using 
the VIF and the condition number indicators) in order to preclude estimation problems 
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in addressing the sample selection issue. The results of the collinearity check reveal a 
VIF under 10 and a condition number under the critical value of 30 established in 
previous studies (see for example Leung and Yu, 1996)
5
. Secondly, we have not been 
able to identify an appropriate exclusion restriction supported by theoretical arguments, 
and the inclusion of such restrictions without having robust arguments to do so could 
harm the performance of the sample selection estimators (see Puhani, 2000). 
Then, we have estimated the determinants of the importance attributed to each of 
the external and internal criteria in terms of ordinary least squares, including the inverse 
Mills ratio as an additional regressor in all the outcome equations. The results show that 
the estimated coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are not significant in any of the 
outcome equations, which suggests the absence of sample selection bias in our models
6
. 
Consequently, we have finally estimated each of the equations of interest by ordinary 
least squares without including the inverse Mills ratio, since the absence of selection 
bias suggests that this is the correct specification for our data. The results of these latter 
estimations are the ones described in the following section of the paper.  
 
Results 
In this section, we report the results of our empirical analysis. Firstly, we 
examine the importance attributed by managers to the six factors of interest. According 
to the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1, the cost of living and the importance 
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given to the fulfillment of sector agreements are the two leading influences on wage 
adjustments. The importance of inflation may be related to its crucial impact on pay 
settlements under different regulatory conditions and economic circumstances, as 
pointed out in the second section of the paper above (see Ingram et al., 1999). As far as 
the fulfillment of sector agreement is concerned, its relevance could be due to the fact 
that agreements at this level are prevalent in the Spanish context, covering most workers 
and, therefore, acting as the baseline for further pay decisions. On the other hand, the 
wages of the firm relative to its competitors seems to be the least important factor for 
management respondents. The reason for this finding could be that competing firms are 
governed by the same sector collective agreement, which sets equal baseline conditions 
for different firms.   
The findings of the regression analysis are documented in Table 2. As far as the 
importance given to the cost of living is concerned, we observe that establishments with 
500 or more employees give more importance to this factor when adjusting wages than 
smaller plants. This result seems to be in line with the idea that, as the size of the 
establishment increases, the employer uses the cost of living as a reference variable in 
order to determine wage increases.  
Regarding the relationship between the human resource variables and the factor 
of interest, we observe that both the percentage of workers with a degree and the use of 
pay for performance have a negative impact on the importance given to the cost of 
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living. A plausible explanation for the results mentioned could be the following. The 
cost of living is a major influence on pay settlements for establishments that are 
heterogeneous and that operate in very different environments. Inflation could be 
interpreted as the “default” variable at the time of setting pay. However, it is possible 
that, under some circumstances, this variable has a weaker effect on wage adjustments. 
This could occur when establishments adopt pay for performance systems and hire a 
workforce with high qualification levels. Under these conditions, the employer gives a 
lower weight to the cost of living variable and focuses on other factors when deciding 
the size of the wage adjustment. In addition, the percentage of permanent workers exerts 
a positive effect on the significance of the dependent variable in pay settlements. 
Permanent workers are commonly seen as the insiders of the organization, that is, the 
ones with a higher influence over the determination of working conditions. Given that 
workers want to maintain the purchasing power of their wages, insiders have the power 
to demand pay adjustments that are closely linked to the cost of living. 
 Finally, the results concerning the effect of the wage bargaining arrangements 
and the influence of trade unions provide only partial support for our predictions. 
Establishments under a plant or firm collective agreement are more concerned about the 
cost of living than plants covered by bargaining at the sector level, but we expected to 
observe a positive influence of any type of collective bargaining on the significance 
attributed to the cost of living. This result seems to reinforce the idea that inflation is a 
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factor of major importance for pay setting even under decentralized wage arrangements 
(see Ingram et al., 1999). Moreover, it reflects the problems that Spanish employers 
have faced when trying to moderate wages and achieve low inflation under 
decentralized bargaining (see Royo, 2007).  
Turning to comparability with wages paid in other firms, plants with between 
100 and 500 employees attribute greater importance to this factor than small 
establishments. However, this effect is not observed in large plants. We observe an 
unpredicted positive correlation between the percentage of workers with a degree and 
the importance given to comparability. Hence, it seems that employers need to compete 
with other establishments if they want to hire and retain a highly qualified workforce, so 
they take into account what other organization pay their employees. Another 
unexpected result concerns the promotion of workers from within, which correlates 
positively with the dependent variable. We claimed that trade unions have information 
on the wages paid by other firms, so they may use this information when negotiating 
their payment conditions. The empirical analysis shows that, contrary to this 
expectation, the influence of trade unions is not correlated with the importance given to 
the comparability factor in pay settlements.  
The next dependent variable is the need to fulfill sector-level collective 
agreements. Firstly, employers in establishments that have between 100 and 499 
workers give less importance to this factor when they adjust their wages. None of the 
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variables related to human resource management and human capital emerge as 
significant in the analysis. When we look at the results obtained for the institutional 
variables, we find that the presence of a collective agreement at the plant or firm level 
exerts a negative influence on the importance given to the fulfillment of the sector level 
agreement in comparison to the presence of a sector agreement. Moreover, the empirical 
analysis shows that trade union influence results in greater concern about the factor of 
interest. This finding suggests that unions act as a surveillance mechanism that controls 
the application of agreed working conditions at sector level. 
As far as the need to recruit and retain employees is concerned, we find the 
following relationships for the structural variables and the market conditions. 
Employers in establishments with 500 or more workers give less importance to this 
factor when they settle their wages in comparison with plants of a small size, which 
confirms our previous hypothesis. In addition, multinational companies are less 
concerned about the need to hire and retain workers than domestic firms. Finally, we 
find no support for the idea that the degree of competition is a positive determinant of 
the importance attributed by the employer to the need to recruit and retain workers.  
Regarding the HRM variables, none of them emerges as a significant 
determinant of the importance given to the need to recruit and retain workers. The only 
exception is the percentage of workers with a degree, which correlates positively with 
the factor of interest. As far as the institutional variables are concerned, we do not 
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observe any significant correlation between the mechanisms of pay determination and 
the importance given to recruiting and retaining workers in pay settlements. On the 
contrary, the influence of unions exerts a negative impact on the relevance given to the 
need to recruit and retain workers. This result may be related to the idea that unions 
protect the employment prospects of insider workers at the expense of outsiders.  
Turning to the consideration of the performance of the firm in pay settlements, 
we observe the following results. First, we predicted a negative influence of the 
multinational variable on the importance given to the performance of the organization, 
and this is confirmed by the empirical analysis. Regarding the HRM policies, we find a 
positive impact of the percentage of workers with a degree and the provision of pay for 
performance on the importance given to our factor of interest. This factor appears to be 
more important in establishments that sign their own collective agreement in 
comparison with plants covered by agreements at the sector level. Despite the fact that 
they give flexibility to employers to adapt to their specific conditions, the presence of a 
mechanism of pay setting other than collective bargaining does not seem to affect the 
consideration given to the performance of the organization. Finally, the influence of 
trade unions does not correlate negatively with the dependent variable.  
The last influence on wage increases considered in our study is the need to 
maintain a good industrial relations climate. According to the empirical analysis, 
establishments with more than 500 employees give a lower importance to this variable 
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when setting pay than plants of a smaller size. This is contrary to our predictions that 
working conditions are poorer in large firms. In fact, it is not clear that job satisfaction 
is higher in small firms (see Clark, 1996), and the evidence that large organizations try 
to compensate workers for unfavorable working conditions is still inconclusive (see 
Belfield and Wei, 2004). A positive relationship emerges between the provision of pay 
for performance and the importance given to the industrial relations climate. The use of 
pay for performance systems is more likely in establishments where trust, consensus 
and information-sharing have been established between employers and workers (see 
Heywood et al., 1998). Hence, the fact that performance pay is used in a workplace may 
be associated with interest on the part of both employers and employees in maintaining 
a good industrial relations climate, so that this climate is a significant variable when it 
comes to wage adjustments. In contrast to our expectations, the importance given to the 
industrial relations climate does not seem to be related to the wage-setting arrangement 
that operates in the establishment. 
 
Conclusions  
In this paper, we have used data from Spanish manufacturing establishments to 
analyze the determinants of the importance given to several factors when the wages of 
production workers are adjusted. Drawing on the theories of pay determination and the 
empirical literature on the pressures on pay settlements, we have identified six 
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significant factors in these processes: the cost of living, the wages of the firm relative to 
its competitors, the of sector-level collective agreements, the need to recruit and retain 
workers, the performance of the firm, and the need to maintain a good industrial 
relations climate. 
We have grouped the explanatory variables into three categories that represent 
circumstances related to the establishment that, in our opinion, may be relevant to the 
analysis of wage adjustments. These categories are: structural characteristics and market 
conditions, HRM policies and human capital variables, and wage-setting arrangements 
and trade union influence. 
Regarding the first set of explanatory variables, our results show that they 
influence the importance attributed by managers to some of the criteria of interest. In 
particular, the size of the establishment and belonging to a multinational corporation 
correlate significantly with the importance given to factors such as the fulfillment of 
sector-level agreements and the need to recruit and retain employees. As far as the third 
set of explanatory variables is concerned, the influence of trade unions and wage-setting 
arrangements also play a significant role in determining the factors that shape pay 
settlements for production workers. 
However, when we look at the impact of the HRM variables, they do not seem to 
be significantly related to the influences on wage adjustments for blue-collar workers. 
Hence, with few exceptions, the decisions concerning the adoption of HRM practices 
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and the six factors considered in this study seem to be to a high degree unrelated. 
Although we cannot give an unequivocal argument for this result, we can think of 
several reasons that may explain the lack of any link between HRM decisions and wage 
setting. 
First, it is possible that employers do not integrate pay decisions in the broader 
HRM policy of the organization. They may decide to manage employee payments 
independently from other personnel practices. Whereas the provision of training and the 
involvement of workers in decision-making are regarded as an investment in human 
capital, wage adjustments may be perceived as a cost to the organization, so the 
management strategy adopted in each case is different.  
 Second, it could be that employers want to integrate wage setting decisions in 
the HRM policy of the organization, but they find institutional constraints on doing so. 
Hence, trade unions may want to control the process of wage adjustment, but they might 
not limit the use of other HRM practices by the employer. If unions participate in pay 
setting and impose restrictions on the process, but the employer is free to adopt other 
HRM decisions, the two processes are driven by different forces.  
Overall, our results seem to indicate that Spanish employers have some room for 
maneuver to link their wage adjustment decisions to workplace characteristics. Hence, 
significant correlations emerge between the factors of influence in pay settlements for 
production workers and the structural variables included in the study. In particular, there 
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is a relationship between the size of the establishment and its foreign ownership, and 
some of the factors of interest. Besides the relevance of collective bargaining as a 
determinant of pay settlements in Spain, and the low levels of affiliation, the influence 
exerted by trade unions also contributes to explaining these processes. Trade union 
pressure results in the lower importance of factors relating to the internal conditions of 
the establishment, such as the need to recruit and retain workers and the performance of 
the organization. These results suggest that trade unions create difficulties in trying to 
link wage adjustments to the particular circumstances of the plant. In contrast, however, 
unions serve as a surveillance mechanism that monitors the fulfillment of sector-level 
collective agreements.  
Obviously, our work is subject to the usual limitations related to the use of cross-
sectional data, since causality relationships cannot be proved. In considering the 
generalizability of these results, the fact that the study refers to production workers and 
the manufacturing sector should be taken into account. An additional limitation of the 
study concerns the factors included as determinants of wage adjustments. Certainly, 
other variables may also have an effect on pay settlements. This is the case of the 
previous wage level of the establishment and the going rate within the industry. Future 
research on the topic should account for the effect of these factors in pay settlements, 
and use longitudinal instead of cross-sectional data. 
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Notes 
1.All the studies mentioned focus on the analysis of the British context. The reason for the amount of 
research in relation to Britain is the existence of databases, such as the WERS (Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey) and the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) Pay Databank survey, which provide 
information on the factors behind pay settlements at the establishment level. 
2.The response rate for the survey is similar or slightly higher to the response rate obtained in other 
surveys that explore human resource management practices and organizational characteristics (see for 
example Diaz-Fernandez et al., 2012; Goergen et al., 2012; or Roche and Teague, 2011).  
3.The questionnaire provides information on pay settlement influences for plants that set general wage 
increases, but not for ones that have not changed or have decreased them. We think that this does not 
compromise the purposes of our study, since wage increases and wage decreases may be driven by 
different forces (see Ingram et al., 1999). 
4.Our measure of trade union influence is based on the perceptions of the manager interviewed. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a more objective indicator such as union density. The main reason for not 
including a question about union density in the questionnaire was that, based on our previous experience, 
managers do not have precise information on this matter. On the other hand, the measure of trade union 
influence based on manager perceptions has already been used in previous research (see Bayo-Moriones 
and Huerta-Arribas, 2002). 
5. Mean VIF = 1.08; Condition Number = 28.64 
6.Besides these two-step models, we have estimated the outcome equations using the full-information 
maximum likelihood method (see Puhani, 2000). This full-information maximum likelihood estimator fits 
the model using a bivariate probit and generally displays better statistical properties than the two-step 
estimator. Again, the results suggest the absence of a sample selection bias. The results of the two-step 
and full maximum likelihood selection models are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Cost of Living Importance given to the cost of living when wages are increased. Standard variable 0.226 0.148 
Comparability Importance given to the wages of the firm relative to its competitors when wages are increased 
Standard variable 
0.105 0.077 
Collective Agreement 
Fulfillment 
Importance given to the fulfillment of sector agreements when wages are increased. Standard variable 0.244 0.177 
Need to Recruit  
and Retain 
Importance given to the need to recruit and retain employees when wages are increased. Standard 
variable 
0.113 0.081 
Performance of the 
Organization 
Importance given to the economic or financial performance of the organization when wages are 
increased. Standard variable 
0.152 0.092 
Industrial Relations  
Climate 
Importance given to the need to maintain a good climate of industrial relations when wages are 
increased. Standard variable 
0.161 0.080 
50 to 99 Employees 1 if the establishment has between 50 and 99 workers; 0 otherwise 0.484 0.500 
100 to 499 Employees 1 if the establishment has between 100 and 499  workers; 0 otherwise 0.464 0.499 
500 Employees or More 1 if the establishment has 500 workers or more; 0 otherwise 0.053 0.224 
Multinational 1 if the establishment belongs to a multinational corporation; 0 otherwise 0.213 0.409 
Competition Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration using 2007 data and 12 industry categories 0.009 0.010 
Training Percentage of workers that have received off-the-job training 82.195 211.512 
Workers with Degree Percentage of workers with a university degree 33.552 27.730 
Internal Promotions* 1 if external applicants are the only source (no internal recruitment); 2 if external applicants are given 
preference; other things being equal; over external applicants; 3 if applications from internal and 
external applicants are treated equally; 4 if internal applicants are given preference; other things being 
equal; over external applicants; 5 if internal applicants are the only source (no internal recruitment) 
4.291 0.854 
Permanent Workers Percentage of permanent workers 85.986 16.264 
Wage Level* 1 if wages in the establishment are far below the average in the sector and region; 2 if wages in the 
establishment are slightly below the average in the sector and region; 3 if wages in the establishment 
are similar to the average in the sector and region; 4 if wages in the establishment are slightly above 
the average in the sector and region; 5 if wages in the establishment are far above  the average in the 
sector and region 
3.655 0.842 
Pay for Performance 1 if any compensation system that links pay to performance at the individual, group, or plant or firm 
level is used; 0 otherwise 
0.532 0.499 
Sector Agreement 1 if the establishment is covered by a collective agreement at sector level; 0 otherwise 0.487 0.500 
Plant Agreement 1 if the establishment is covered by a collective agreement at plant or firm level; 0 otherwise 0.497 0.500 
Other Mechanism 1 if wages are determined by a mechanism other than collective bargaining (i. e. unilateral setting by 
the employer or individual bargaining with employees); 0 otherwise 
0.016 0.126 
Union Influence* 1 if trade unions have a very low influence over production workers; 2 if trade unions have a low 
influence over production workers; 3 if trade unions have a medium influence over production 
workers; 4 if trade unions have a high influence over production workers; 5 if trade unions have a very 
high influence over production workers 
2.910 1.151 
* The distribution of the discrete variables with more than two values is the following. Internal Promotions: (1) =2.02%; (2) =1.42%; (3) =9.72%; (4) 
=39.07%; (5) =47.77%. Wage Level: (1) =1.13%; (2) =6.15%; (3) =33.40%; (4) =44.77%; (5) =14.55%. Union Influence: (1) =11.02%; (2) =30.90%; 
(3) =21.22%; (4) =29.76%; (5) =7. 11%. 
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Table 2: Determinants of the Factors Taken into Account when Wages are Increased: Multivariate 
Regression 
 
 EXTERNAL FACTORS   
    INTERNAL FACTORS 
 Cost of Living Comparability Collective 
Agreement 
Fulfillment 
Need to Recruit and 
Retain Employees 
Performance of the 
Organization 
Industrial 
Relations Climate 
Constant 0.152*** 
(0.053) 
0.116*** 
(0.028) 
0.339*** 
(0.060) 
0.145*** 
(0.028) 
0.127*** 
(0.032) 
0.121*** 
(0.028) 
100 to 499 Employees 0.018 
(0.013) 
 
0.011* 
(0.007) 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
500 Employees or more 0.079*** 
(0.027) 
 
0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.031) 
-0.026* 
(0.015) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
Multinational 0.015 
(0.015) 
 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.027 
(0.018) 
-0.029*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Competition -0.394 
(0.588) 
0.207 
(0.309) 
0.543 
(0.674) 
0.214 
(0.313) 
-0.190 
(0.353) 
0.035 
(0.316) 
Training -0.009 
(0.017) 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Workers with Degree -0.156*** 
(0.059) 
 
0.061** 
(0.030) 
-0.035 
(0.067) 
0.068** 
(0.031) 
0.060* 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.031) 
Internal Promotions 0.000 
(0.007) 
 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
Permanent Workers 0.067* 
(0.038) 
 
-0.030 
(0.020) 
-0.050 
(0.043) 
-0.012 
(0.020) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
Wage Level 0.007 
(0.008) 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Pay for Performance -0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.011* 
(0.007) 
Plant Agreement 0.033*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.068*** 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
Other Mechanism 0.093 
(0.057) 
 
0.001 
(0.030) 
-0.084 
(0.065) 
-0.041 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.034) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
Union Influence -0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
R2 0.058 0.026 0.066 0.065 0.054 0.020 
N 602 602 602 602 602 602 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
